Metaethics: Some Brief Remarks
by David A. Horner and J. P. Moreland
Metaethics: A Short Companion is a small book about a big topic. Authors David A. Horner and J. P. Moreland provide a dense introduction to the field of metaethics that shows their vast knowledge of this space. My own acquaintance with metaethics is neither wide nor well-informed. Even so, I benefitted greatly and am confident those with a general familiarity of philosophical ethics will find this volume a helpful resource. I’m grateful to B&H Academic for a complimentary copy.
The book is well organized throughout and readers will gain a broad understanding of a variety of theories in the arena of metaethics. Distinguishing amongst the various views, chapters 2-5 show strengths and weaknesses of each metaethical theory on offer while defending their own flavor of moral realism.
I will highlight just a couple strong points from the final chapter. But first, an important definition on which the entire book depends: “moral realism: the metaethical view that objective (mind–independent) moral facts and properties exist, that moral judgments are truth–apt descriptions of those facts that express cognitive states of belief, and that some moral judgments are in fact true and some are knowable” (p 182).
Zeroing in on the question posed by the chapter titled, “Why Should I Care about Moral Realism?” Horner and Moreland answer, in part, “because several robust aspects of a Christian worldview make it rational to do so.” Specifically, a Christian worldview maintains “it is rational to treat or use a thing according to its nature, according to the way it was designed to flourish and function best, rather than treating and using it in a harmful way contrary to its nature.” (p 170).
Humanity, as created by God, is hardwired to flourish and it is only rational to treat ourselves and others in accordance with that goal. After all, “it is rational to drive a car on the road instead of on the bottom of the ocean. It is rational to plant flowers in rich soil rather than lay them on top of a hot roof. Being moral is the most rational way to live because it’s how we flourish, given our nature as image bearers of God.” Moreover, humans have an innate sense of right and wrong, and so “it’s against the grain of moral reality” to ignore it (p 171).
Still, one might argue that maintaining a moral point of view (MPV) for some intended outcome is just a form of utilitarianism. Horner and Moreland anticipate this by offering a keen insight. Utilitarians commonly recognize a distinction between moral acts that have intrinsic value and ones that have instrumental value, naturally opting for the latter. However, there is a hybrid view, so to speak; what they call “mixed values.” If moral acts are “both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable,” then they no longer are solely means to an end. Thus, “adopting the MPV is instrumentally valuable as a means to flourishing and it is intrinsically valuable in and of itself since it is part of the purpose and meaning of our existence, an important aspect of what it is to flourish in the first place” (emphasis original, p 171).
Finally, one could counter that, despite appearances of altruism, all moral acts are really and ultimately an expression of self-interest. Nevertheless, ethical or rational egoism (with all its varieties) fails to recognize two kinds of interests are at play, “personal self-interest” and a collective or “kinded self-interest.” On the latter, kinded self-interest is “based on a recognition of the kind of thing I am, viz., a being of great intrinsic value having been created in the image of God” (172). As members of a group of beings whose great value emerges from the Creator, humans can and should maintain a strong sense of moral realism because it is rational to do so.
By providing these reasons for being moral and adopting a MPV, the authors marry what is right with what is good. It’s a kind of holy matrimony that illustrates the essential connection between duty and flourishing, all of which are grounded in the Christian worldview.
The case made for moral realism is strong. The case for moral realism from a Christian worldview is stronger still. Horner and Moreland have given us every rational reason to embrace it while fairly interacting with alternative theories.
Readers read!
Afterthoughts: There were a couple instances where the expression “MPV” (moral point of view) was incorrectly listed as “MVP” (p 169, 176). Otherwise, I did not find any errors.
Everyone is encouraged to become familiar with the helpful glossary before beginning the book as this will serve to ground understanding.